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INTRODUCTION

The municipal securities industry, an important segment of the
national capital markets, directly affects both the quality of life and
the pace of community development throughout the nation. Municipal securities, broadly defined to include all debt securities issued
*
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or guaranteed by the states and their political subdivisions,' are the
vehicle by which states, their agencies, and local governments finance both long- and short-term debt requirements. In calendar
1975, for example, the municipal securities industry raised
approximately 29.2 billion dollars in long-term issues.2 In 1973,
8,147 long- and short-term issues raised almost 48 billion dollars, 3
or approximately one-quarter of all direct expenditures of state and
local governments-for that year.4 Aid from the federal government
for the same year was 39 billion dollars.5
The proceeds of municipal securities go not only to highways
and other typically governmental projects, but also to housing, hospital, and university construction, pollution control facilities, and
industrial development,6 as well as short-term financing of governmental activities in anticipation of the receipt of tax revenues, federal revenue sharing contributions, and long-term capitalization.
These securities, which are unique because of the nature of their
issuers and their tax exempt status under existing court decisions
and federal tax laws, have contributed substantially to the develop1. This Article uses the term "municipal securities" as defined in § 3(a)(29) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended [hereinafter cited as the 1934 Act], 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78c(a)(29) (Supp. 1976) to mean
securities which are direct obligations of, or obligations guaranteed as to principal or
interest by, a State or any political subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality
of a State or any political subdivision thereof, or any municipal corporate instrumentality of one or more States, or any security which is an industrial development bond (as
defined in Section 103(c)(2) of [the Internal Revenue Code of 1954]) the interest on
which is excludable from gross income under section 103(a)(1) of [such Code].
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 103(a)(1) appears to be somewhat more expansive in "defining"

municipal securities by excluding from gross income the interest on
the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession of the United States, or any
political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or of the District of Columbia.
Yet another definition of municipal securities is set forth in § 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act of
1933 [hereinafter cited as the 1933 Act], as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1970), that
exempts from the registration and other provisions of the 1933 Act
[any security issued or guaranteed . . . by the District of Columbia, or by any State
of the United States, or by any political subdivision of a State or Territory, or by any
public instrumentality of one or more States or Territories.
Although this lack of parallel definitions is disturbing, the disparities generally are not viewed
as being destructive of the federal regulatory scheme.
2.
3.

THE DAILY BOND BUYER, Jan. 2, 1976, at 1, col. 4.
13 THE BOND BUYER, MUNICIPAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS 7 (June 1975) [hereinafter cited

as FINANCIAL STATISTICS].

4. Id. at 47.
5. Id.
6. S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1975) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.]. In 1975,
for example, approximately $1.673 billion in pollution control issues and $1.292 billion in
hospital and medical care facilities issues were marketed. FINANCIAL STATISTICS, supra note
3, at 42-46.
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ment of localities across the country.
With the enactment of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975
(1975 Amendments), 7 brokers, dealers, and banks first became subject to comprehensive federal regulation of their municipal securities activities. The principal impact of this legislation, which sub-8
stantially amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act),
upon the municipal securities industry was the establishment of a
regulatory framework for transactions in municipal securities. As an
integral part of this framework, the 1975 Amendments created the
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (Board),9 as an independent, self-regulatory body charged with primary responsibility for
developing rules for the municipal securities industry, subject to the
general oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(Commission). This Article discusses the nature and functioning of
the Board and some specific areas of Board activity.
II.
A.

1975

AMENDMENTS

Previous Securities Laws Coverage and Legislative
Antecedents

Prior to enactment of the 1975 Amendments, municipal securities were defined as "exempted securities" under the 1934 Act. 0 As
a result of this statutory exclusion, municipal securities were exempt from the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act, and brokers
and dealers effecting transactions exclusively in municipal securities, unlike their counterparts engaged in a general securities busi7. Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (Dec. 1, 1975) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Amendments].
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78 et seq. (1970).
9. 1934 Act § 15B(b)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(b)(1) (Supp. 1976), actually directed the
Commission to establish the Board. This was accomplished in the fall of 1975. See note 33
infra.
10. Prior to the 1975 Amendments, § 3(a)(12) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12)
(1970), exempted
securities which are direct obligations of or obligations guaranteed as to principal or
interest by a State or any political subdivision thereof, or by any agency or instrumentality of a State or any political subdivision thereof, or any municipal corporate instrumentality of one or more States; or any security which is an industrial development bond.
The substance of this language has been incorporated by the 1975 Amendments into the
definition of "municipal security" set forth in § 3(a)(29) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §
78c(a)(29) (Supp. 1976); see note 1 supra. Section 3(a) (12), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(12) (Supp.
1976), now merely defines "exempted securities" to include "municipal securities." Municipal securities are not "exempted securities," however, for all purposes of the 1934 Act, as
§ 3(a)(12) lists specific provisions that are applicable to municipal securities despite exclusions for "exempted securities." See, e.g., 1934 Act §§ 15(c)(2)-(3) & 15A(f), 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 78o(c)(2)-(3), 78o(3)(f) (Supp. 1976).
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ness, were not required to be registered with the Commission" and
were not subject to the extensive system of regulation for the general
securities industry under the 1934 Act. Transactions in municipal
securities were not subject to the registration requirements of the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the 1933 Act),' 2 but only to
certain of the antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts and the
3
rules and regulations thereunder.'
Because municipal securities are traded in over-the-counter
markets, securities firms trading only in municipal and other unlisted securities did not become members of national securities exchanges. The rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. (the "NASD"), which contain economic incentives to membership, did not apply to transactions in municipal securities." Thus
firms that dealt only in municipal securities were not encouraged by
11. Former section 15(a)(1) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (1970), required
brokers and dealers effecting transactions in nonexempted securities to register with the
Commission. The 1975 Amendments extended this registration requirement to securities
firms trading exclusively in municipal securities by providing in § 3(a)(12) of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(12) (Supp. 1976), that municipal securities are not exempted securities
for purposes of § 15. See note 10 supra. Banks, which are permitted to engage in certain
brokerage activities, see note 16 infra, were not required to register with the Commission prior
to the 1975 Amendments because they are neither brokers nor dealers, as defined in the 1934
Act. See notes 32 & 42 infra. Section 15B(a)(1) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(a)(1)
(Supp. 1976), now requires banks that are municipal securities dealers to register with the
Commission. See text accompanying notes 42 & 43 infra.
12. 1933 Act § 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1970); see note 1 supra.
13. Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970), and § 10(b) and former §
15(c)(1) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78o(c)(1) (1970), for example, were and are
applicable to transactions in municipal securities. See S. REP., supra note 6, at 42. Former
sections 15(c)(2) & 15(c)(3) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(c)(2)-(3) (1970), on the other
hand, were inapplicable to transactions in municipal securities prior to the 1975 Amendments.
14. Section 15A(m) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(m) (1970) (redesignated § 15A(f)
by the 1975 Amendments, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(f) (Supp. 1976)), provides that nothing in §
15A, dealing with registered securities associations, "shall be construed to apply with respect
to any transaction by a broker or dealer in any exempted security." The rules of the NASD
were drafted accordingly. See, e.g., NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. I, § 4; NASD Uniform
Practice Code § 1(a). Under art. IH, § 25 of the Rules of Fair Practice, NASD members are
required to deal with nonmember brokers and dealers on the same terms offered to public
customers, thus restricting the resale pricing benefits of the dealer discount or concession to
members. Under the 1975 Amendments, municipal securities are no longer exempted securities for most provisions of § 15A. Section 15A(e)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(e)(1) (Supp. 1976),
now authorizes the rules of registered securities associations to provide that dealings by its
members with nonmember brokers and dealers (other than bank dealers with respect to
transactions in municipal securities) shall be "at the same prices, for the same commissions
or fees, and on the same terms and conditions as are by [its members] accorded to the
general public." As applied to the municipal securities industry, this would encourage nonmember firms to join the NASD by prohibiting them from participating in underwriting
syndicates with member firms and effectively raising the purchase cost to nonmember customers of municipal securities obtained from or through a nonmember firm.
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this fact alone to become members of the NASD. Furthermore,
integrated corporate and municipal securities firms that were members of the NASD were not subject to regulation by it of their municipal securities activities.' 5
A substantial portion of the municipal securities industry consists of banks, which are authorized to underwrite and otherwise
deal in municipal securities that are general obligations of their
issuers, as well as unsolicited brokerage activities in securities generally.' 6 Banks are subject to regulation by the three federal bank
regulatory agencies: the Comptroller of the Currency for national
banks, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the
Federal Reserve) for member state banks and bank holding companies (and their subsidiary banks if neither federally chartered nor
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)), and
the FDIC for all other banks insured by it. Although the overall
activities of banks are subject to the scrutiny of these federal bank
authorities, there was no focus on municipal securities activities
prior to the 1975 Amendments.
The exclusion of municipal securities transactions and professionals from the extensive system of regulation applicable to corporate securities and firms transacting business in such securities reflected congressional recognition that the municipal securities industry had avoided the excesses and abuses of the corporate securities area' 7 and that investors in municipal securities generally were
more sophisticated and less in need of protection than investors in
corporate securities."8 Because of lower personal income tax rates
prevailing at the time and the substantial investment required for
most municipal securities, the distribution of municipal securities
15. See note 13 supra.
16. Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Supp. IV, 1974). As one of many exceptions to the general limitation imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 on the ability of
national banks to engage in securities transactions as principal, § 24 authorizes dealing in,
underwriting, and purchasing for investment any "general obligations of any state or of any
political subdivision thereof." Accordingly, national banks may underwrite general obligations securities, but are not permitted to underwrite revenue bonds other than for housing,
university, or dormitory purposes (which are exempted under another clauseof § 24). Direct
placements of municipal and corporate securities, however, do not fall within the general
limitation and are permitted.
17. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1933) (exemption under the 1933 Act);
Hearings on S.R. 84, S.R. 56 & S.R. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7037-46 (1934) (need for including municipal securities within coverage
of 1934 Act).
18. See Hearingson S. 1933 & S. 2474 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 49-50 (1974) (statement
of SEC Commissioner John R. Evans) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Hearings].

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:903

among individuals in the 1930's and for many years thereafter was
limited to persons of substantial means for whom the tax-exempt
status of these securities' interest income compensated for their
relatively modest yields. Banks and fire and casualty insurance
companies, the other principal categories of investors in municipal
securities, are viewed generally as able to fend for themselves in
securities transactions.
With increased personal income tax rates and higher yields on
municipal securities in recent years, however, municipal securities
have begun to have investment appeal to individuals of less affluence, many unsophisticated in their investment judgment and risking severe financial damage in the event of loss. In 1974, over 60
billion dollars of the 207 billion dollars of municipal securities outstanding were held by "households," a category including
individuals, family trusts, and unincorporated businesses.' 9 This
increased individual investment unfortunately facilitated abuses by
a small group in the municipal securities industry. In the course of
ensuing antifraud actions brought by the Commission, the egregious
misconduct of this minority, concentrating in "boiler room" operations involving the use of high pressure tactics to bilk gullible individuals,"0 drew attention to the limited effectiveness of antifraud
rules in protecting investors from dealer misconduct.2'
Recognizing the integrity of most municipal securities professionals and the efficient functioning of the industry in providing
debt financing to issuers and maintaining a secondary market for
investors, 2 Congress sought in the 1975 Amendments to provide a
sufficient basis of authority for the development of a comprehensive
set of industry regulations. Comparing the lack of authority in the
Commission and the NASD to prevent undesirable practices by
municipal securities professionals with the regulations to which the
19. S. REP., supra note 6, at 41-42. Although the percentage of all outstanding municipal securities held by noninstitutional investors has been declining, the absolute dollar
amount has increased dramatically from $30.8 billion in 1960 to $62.3 billion in 1974. Id.
20. For an example of the tactics employed by boiler room operators see SEC v. R.J.
Allen & Assoc., Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 94,920 (S.D. Fla.
1974). Injunctive and enforcement proceedings brought by the Commission against registered
and unregistered brokers and dealers, although successful in closing down an illegal securities
operation by permanent injunction or revocation of registration, necessarily are ex post facto
actions of less practical benefit to investors than an effective program of fraud prevention.
In addition, the lack of recordkeeping requirements for unregistered brokers and dealers prior
to the 1975 Amendments meant that the monitoring and evidentiary functions performed by
such requirements were not available to the Commission in its antifraud compliance efforts.
21. S. REP., supra note 6, at 43.
22. Id. at 43-44.
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activities of brokers and dealers trading in corporate securities were
subject, Congress concluded that "the time has come to revise the
[1934] Act to subject municipal securities professionals to essentially the same regulatory scheme that applies to other securities
'3
activities.
Specifically, concerning this regulatory scheme for developing
a completely new body of substantive industry regulations for a
previously unregulated industry-a task not confronted by the
Commission, the national securities exchanges, or the NASDCongress acknowledged again, as in 1934, the inability of government directly to impose effective regulation on a wide scale in the
securities context." The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs (Senate Committee) stated:
The Committee believes the historical reasons which persuaded our predecessors to delegate government authority to national securities exchanges and
national securities associations remain valid and justify the establishment of
a self-regulatory structure for the municipal securities industry. In fact, it is
evident from the history of the legislation that support for some type of selfregulatory scheme for the municipal securities industry is widespread. Under
the federal securities laws since 1934 and 1938, self-regulation has played and
will continue to play an essential role in regulating the corporate securities
markets. The bill would simply extend this principle to the municipal securities markets. "5

B.

Nature of the Board as a Self-Regulatory Organization

Consistent with the expressed intent of Congress concerning
self-regulation and in the absence of an existing body comprehending and representative of all industry participants, Congress initially considered the establishment of a national association of municipal securities dealers (NAMSD), an independent membership
association comparable in status and function to the NASD with
respect to broker-dealer activities.26 This approach, however, met
23. Id. at 43.
24. Id. at 22. This necessarily involves a balancing with the potential conflicts between

self-regulators' private interests and public duties, a subject reviewed in depth by the Senate
Committee with respect to changes effected by the 1975 Amendments in the Commission's
authority over self-regulatory organizations. See id. at 22-38.
25. Id. at 46.
26. See S. 2474, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1973). As the Commission commented, authority for the establishment of such an organization under former § 15A of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1970)-as opposed to its creation by the Commission pursuant to a specific
legislative directive-could have been accomplished merely by providing that municipal
securities are not exempted securities for purposes of § 15A(m), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(m) (1970)
(redesignated by the 1975 Amendments as § 15A(f), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(f) (Supp. 1976)).
See 1974 Hearings, supra note 18, at 79. Section 15A(m) was the provision in the 1934 Act

that precluded registered securities associations from adopting rules with respect to munici-
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strong objections founded on the necessary participation of commercial banks as members of NAMSD.Y7 Banks or separately identifiable departments or divisions of banks that are municipal securities
dealers (bank dealers), 8 which like other banks traditionally have
been subject to regulation of their activities by the federal bank
regulatory agencies, would have become subject to duplicative and
potentially inconsistent self-regulatory enforcement as members of
NAMSD. On the other hand, failure to regulate the municipal securities activities of bank dealers, it was argued, would have had an
adverse effect upon the competitive ability of securities firms with
respect to municipal securities. Separate and possibly "unequal"
regulation by the bank regulatory agencies could have led to the
same distortions in competition.
Following the recommendation of the Commission, among oth2
9
ers, Congress resolved this problem of regulatory coordination by
simplifying the structure and delimiting the powers of the new selfregulatory organization." The resulting body is unique among all
independent, self-regulatory organizations in the respects described
below.
(1)

Nonmembership Organization

First, the Board-unlike the NASD, the stock exchanges, and
the proposed NAMSD-is not a voluntary membership organization
composed of industry participants that, as the objects of substantive regulation, are subject to the organization's rules by means and
because of their membership status. Pursuant to the statutory requirements of the 1975 Amendments,' the Board consists of fifteen
members, five of whom represent municipal securities brokers and
municipal securities dealers 32 other than banks and organizations
pal and other exempted securities. See note 14 supra.
27. See 1974 Hearings, supra note 18, at 50-53, 218-19.
28. This basically is the definition utilized by the Board in its rule D-8. The term
"separately identifiable department or division" of a bank has been defined by the Board
pursuant to § 15B(b)(2)(H) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(b)(2)(H) (Supp. 1976), in
its rule G-1. See text accompanying notes 88-90 infra.
29. 1974 Hearings,supra note 18, at 52-53, 219-21.
30. The Board is defined to be a "self-regulatory organization" for purposes of rulemaking oversight by the Commission and annual reports by the Commission to Congress. 1934
Act § 3(a)(26).
31. Id. § 15B(b)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 1976). Pursuant to § 15B(b)
(2)(B)(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 1976) the Board is authorized to increase, but
not decrease the number of its members, provided that the whole Board always shall have
an odd number of members.
32. Section 3(a)(30) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(30) (Supp. 1976), defines the
term "municipal securities dealer" to mean:
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affiliated with banks; five of whom represent municipal securities
dealers that are banks or organizations affiliated with banks; and
five of whom are public members, not associated with any broker,
dealer, or municipal securitie s dealer. At least one of the public
members must represent investors in municipal securities and another must be representative of issuers of municipal securities. The
initial members of the Board, who were appointed by the Commission,33 will serve two-year terms expiring September 5, 1977. Successor members of the Board are to be nominated and elected pursuant
to procedures the Board will adopt in rule form. The Commission
will not play a role in the election of successor members except for
the purpose of assuring that public members are not associated with
a municipal securities professional and that at least one is representative of issuers and one of investors."
Lacking "members" in the sense of the other self-regulatory
organizations and therefore unable to finance its operations by
means of membership dues and assessments, the Board is authorized and directed by statute to adopt rules requiring municipal
securities brokers and municipal securities dealers to pay "such
reasonable fees and charges as may be necessary or appropriate to
defray the costs and expenses of operating and administering the
Board."3 The Board to date has imposed two charges under this
any person (including a separately identifiable department or division of a bank) engaged in the business of buying and selling municipal securities for his own account,
through a broker or otherwise.
Specific exclusions are provided for persons trading for their own accounts, individually or
as fiduciaries, "not as a part of a regular business" and for banks trading in municipal
securities only as fiduciaries. Section 3(d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(d) (1970), provides
that issuers of municipal securities and their officers and employees (acting in their official
capacities) are not brokers, dealers, or municipal securities dealers "solely by reason of
buying, selling, or effecting transactions in the issuer's securities." The definition of "municipal securities dealer" was necessary since banks are excluded specifically from the definitions
of "broker" and "dealer" set forth in §§ 3(a)(5) and 3(a)(6) of the Act.
The 1975 Amendments also defined the term "municipal securities broker" to mean "a
broker engaged in the business of effecting transactions in municipal securities for the account of others." Id. § 3(a)(31). Banks, which frequently act as agent with respect to transactions in municipal securities, are not municipal securities brokers because they are not brokers.
33. In SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11,469 (June 12, 1975), the Commission solicited from the public recommendations of individuals for appointment to the Board.
The appointment of the initial members of the Board was announced in SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 11,635 (Sept. 5, 1975).
34. 1934 Act § 15B(b)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 1976).
35. Id. The Commission is authorized under § 15B(c)(8) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §
78o-4(c)(8) (Supp. 1976), to discipline or remove members and employees of the Board for
willful violations of the 1934 Act, the rules and regulations thereunder, and for abuse of
authority.
36. Id. § 15B(b)(2)(J), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(b)(2)(J) (Supp. 1976).
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authorization, the first requiring each securities firm effecting transactions in municipal securities and each bank dealer to pay a onetime fee of one hundred dollars,"7 and the second imposing a five
cent charge per 1,000 dollar face amount of new issues of municipal
securities underwritten or otherwise distributed by or with the assistance of a municipal securities professional acting as principal or
agent." As an independent self-regulatory organization, the Board
is not deemed to be part of the federal government and receives no
federal funding.
The members of the Board have the constituent affiliation traditionally associated with self-regulatory organizations and draw
upon their respective areas of expertise and interest in developing
rules for the industry. This process embodies the essence of selfregulation: knowledgeable development of transactional and ethical
standards of industry conduct by the industry acting in conjunction
with interested members of the public.
(2)

Regulated Persons and Activities

As noted earlier, prior to the 1975 Amendments, brokers, dealers, and bank dealers were not required to register with the
Commission by reason of their transactions in municipal securities.3 9 The Commission did not regulate integrated firms (i.e. those
transacting business in both corporate and municipal securities)
specifically with respect to their municipal securities activities.
Similarly, the NASD did not regulate its members that were integrated firms with respect to these activities."
The 1975 Amendments extended the registration requirement
of section 15 of the 1934 Act to brokers and dealers effecting transactions in municipal securities. This was accomplished by amending
the definition of "exempted securities" in section 3(a)(12) of the
1934 Act to exclude municipal securities for purposes of section 15,
among others.' In addition, section 15B(a)(1) of the 1934 Act now
requires the registration with the Commission of all municipal securities dealers (unless already registered as a broker or dealer under
section 15), including the option for a bank dealer applicant to
37. MSRB Rule A-12 (1975).
38. MSRB Rule A-13 (1976). This assessment does not apply, however, to short-term
issues having a final stated maturity of less than 2 years.
39. See note 11 supra.
40. 1934 Act § 15A(m) (redesignated as § 15A(f), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(f) (Supp. 1976);
see notes 14 & 15 supra and accompanying text.
41. See notes 10 & 11 supra.
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register a separately identifiable department or division. 2 Banks
that act as agents in effecting transactions in securities, however,
are not required to register with the Commission by reason of such
3
"brokerage" activities.1
The Board's rulemaking jurisdiction, set forth in section
15B(b) (2) of the 1934 Act, authorizes and directs the Board to "propose and adopt rules to effect the purposes of [the 1934 Act] with
respect to transactions in municipal securities effected by brokers,
dealers, and municipal securities dealers."" The balance of section
15B(b)(2) refines and strengthens the general grant of authority by
identifying in paragraph (C) specific purposes the Board is to consider in adopting rules and setting forth in the remainder of paragraphs (A) through (K) certain subject matter areas in which the
Board is directed "as a minimum" to propose and adopt rules.45
Among the purposes of the Board's rules set forth in section
15B(b) (2) (C) are preventing fraudulent and manipulative acts and
practices, promoting just and equitable principles of trade, fostering
industry cooperation, facilitating municipal securities transactions,
encouraging the development of a free and open market in municipal securities, and protecting investors and the public interest. The
Board's rules are not to be designed to allow unfair discrimination,
fix profits, commissions, or prices, impose unnecessary or inappropriate burdens on competition, or regulate matters outside the
Board's jurisdiction. Specific areas to be addressed by the Board's
rules include standards of professional qualification and operational
42. Unlike the definition of "municipal securities broker" in § 3(a)(31), 15 U.S.C.A. §
78c(a)(31) (Supp. 1976), which establishes a new subgroup within the definition of "broker"
contained in § 3(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (1970), "municipal securities dealer" creates an
entirely new group consisting of both "dealers" and banks, which are neither "brokers" nor
"dealers." See note 32 supra. Although municipal securities dealers are required to register
as such by § 15B(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(a)(1) (Supp. 1976), the provision contemplates
that municipal securities dealers that are "brokers" or "dealers" and thus registerable under
§ 15(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(a) (Supp. 1976), will do so. Accordingly, only
bank dealers (or their separately identifiable departments and divisions) and "intrastate"
dealers that are municipal securities dealers register under § 15B(a) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(a) (Supp. 1976). Section 15B(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(a) (Supp. 1976), does
not impose a registration requirement on municipal securities brokers because they necessarily are "brokers" and thus required to register under § 15(a)-unless they conduct a purely
intrastate business, in which case they are not required to register under either section.
43. See note 32 supra.
44. It was unnecessary for the section to refer to "transactions. .. effected by brokers,
municipal securities brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers" because all municipal
securities brokers are defined to be brokers. 1934 Act § 3(a)(31), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(31)
(Supp. 1976); see notes 32 & 42 supra.
45. The adoption of rules in one subject area, arbitration, was left to the Board's
discretion pursuant to § 15B(b)(2)(D), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(b)(2)(D) (Supp. 1976).
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capability, scope and frequency of periodic compliance examinations, form and content of quotations, recordkeeping requirements,
definition of "separately identifiable department or division" of a
bank dealer for purposes of registration of a part of a bank dealer
rather than the whole bank," terms and conditions of sales of new
issues to municipal securities investment portfolios, administration
and financing of the Board, and procedures for the nomination and
election of successor members of the Board.
To understand the unique nature of the Board's rulemaking
jurisdiction, section 15B(b) (2) of the 1934 Act must be read together
with the statutory authority of the national securities exchanges and
the NASD to adopt rules applicable to their members. The grant of
authority to the Board "with respect to transactions in municipal
securities" by brokers, dealers, and bank dealers then must be interpreted in light of the specific purposes and subject matter areas set
forth in sections 15B(b) (2) (A) through (K). In other words, the selfregulatory functions of the Board as expressed in section 15B of the
1934 Act cannot be construed without identifying the regulatory
vacuum Congress intended the Board to fill.
Prior to the 1975 Amendments, the rulemaking jurisdiction of
the national securities exchanges, and to a lesser extent the NASD,
was subject to some controversy. In their capacity as membership
bodies-disregarding for the moment the exercise of delegated governmental power-exchanges prior to the 1934 Act arguably had the
consensual authority customarily granted such bodies to prescribe
regulations with respect to the relationship between the exchange
and its members, including membership in the exchange, and the
members' relationships with each other. Since exchanges provided
facilities of economic benefit to their members, authority also existed to prescribe regulations governing the facilities and their use
by the members.
With the enactment of the 1934 Act came the acknowledgment
that exchanges are affected with a public interest. As a condition
to delegating governmental powers to exchanges, however, former
section 6 of the 1934 Act imposed a registration requirement for
exchanges that required rules of the exchanges to provide for disciplinary sanctions against members for conduct "inconsistent with
just and equitable principles of trade."4 7 Former section 6 did not
state that exchanges must define just and equitable principles of
trade or limit their ability to do so. In former section 19(b) of the
46. See text accompanying notes 88-90 infra.
47. Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, § 6(b), 48 Stat. 886.
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1934 Act,4" the Commission was authorized "to alter or supplement
the rules" of a registered exchange relating to trading in listed securities, financial responsibility requirements for members, and "similar matters" concerning transactions utilizing the exchange's facilities, thus recognizing implicitly an exchange's authority to adopt
rules in these areas.
As noted by the Senate Committee in 1975, however, it was not
clear whether or to what extent these specific provisions defined the
limits of an exchange's rulemaking jurisdiction,49 especially in view
of former section 6(c), which provided that nothing in the 1934 Act
shall be construed to prevent any exchange from adopting and enforcing
any rule not inconsistent with [the 1934 Act] and the rules and regulations
thereunder and the applicable laws of the State in which it is located."

Thus it was understood that national securities exchanges as selfregulatory organizations were supposed to be responsible for listing
securities, regulating facilities provided, regulating the use of facilities and the manner of effecting transactions by means of an exchange's facilities, financial responsibility of members, and defining
just and equitable principles of trade to be followed by members
with each other and with their customers, at least with respect to
listed securities. The extent, if any, to which exchanges could or
should regulate the conduct of their members with respect to unlisted securities and activities unrelated to securities remained
uncertain.
With the addition of section 15A by the Maloney Act in 1938,1'
the 1934 Act authorized the registration of national securities associations and the delegation of certain governmental powers incident
to the contemplated self-regulatory role they were expected to perform. The NASD, the only organization registered under section
15A, did not offer its members the use of any facilities comparable
to the auction markets maintained by the exchanges. 5 -Accordingly,
the rulemaking jurisdiction for registered securities associations,
rather than adopting the format of former sections 6 and 19(b) of
the 1934 Act, was stated in terms of purposes and standards. Apart
from minimum rule requirements relating to the membership form
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
3(b)(8),

Id. § 19(b), 48 Stat. 899.
S. REP., supra note 6, at 26-27.
Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, § 6(c), 48 Stat. 886.
Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 677, § 1, 52 Stat. 1070.
See, e.g., note 14 supra and accompanying text.
S. REP., supra note 6, at 27; see 1934 Act §§ 15A(b)(8), (12), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(12) (1970).
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or organization, the form and content of quotations, and optional
economic incentives to membership, former section 15A(b)(8) provided the basis of the NASD's rulemaking jurisdiction by requiring
that
the rules of the association [be] designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to
provide safeguards against unreasonable profits or unreasonable rates of commissions or other charges, and, in general, to protect investors and the public
interest, and to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free
and open market; and not [be] designed to permit unfair discrimination
between customers, or issuers, or brokers or dealers, to fix minimum profits,
to impose any schedule of prices, or to impose any schedule or fix minimum
rates of commissions, allowances, discounts, or other charges."

The scope of the NASD's application of its rulemaking jurisdiction has depended upon two major considerations. First, under former section 15A(b) (3) of the 1934 Act, only brokers and dealers
effecting or inducing transactions in securities "otherwise than on
a national securities exchange" could become members. In other
words, eligibility for membership depended, with minor exceptions,
upon participation in over-the-counter markets. The almost universal concept of membership in a registered securities association55
stands in contrast with the concept of membership in exchanges.'
Consistent with the retention and expansion of the membership
concept, section 15A required the adoption of qualification rules57
and disciplinary procedures for violation of the association's rules
by its members. 8 Rules relating to members' relationships with
each other and with their customers were grounded within the statutory purposes and standards referred to in former section 15A(b) (8).
Secondly, the only explicit reference to the types of securities
an association's rules were to address with respect to transactions
effected by its members was in former section 15A(b)(12), which
required the adoption of "provisions governing the form and content of quotations relating to securities sold otherwise than on a
national securities exchange." The only explicit limitation on this
54. Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 677, § 7, 52 Stat. 1070.
55. Except, of course, for the provisions of former § 15A(b)(3) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3(b)(3) (1970), which authorized discrimination on the bases of geographical location
and type of business done, membership in a registered securities association was and is
universally available to all brokers and dealers meeting statutory requirements and the association's qualification rules. Banks, however, are ineligible for membership in a registered
securities association. 1934 Act §§ 15A(b)(3), (g)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78o-3(b), (g)(1) (Supp.
1976).
56. See S. REP., supra note 6, at 23-24.
57. Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 677, § 1, 52 Stat. 1070 (former § 15A(b)(5).
58. Id. (former § 15A(b)(9), (10)).
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broad area of rulemaking jurisdiction was in former section 15A(m),
which excluded municipal and other exempted securities. Obviously, registered securities associations were intended to do more
than just establish qualificati.on standards for their members and
regulate in a general manner the relationships among members and
between members and their customers. Similarly, although former
section 15A did not expressly preclude registered securities associations from regulating their members' transactions in listed securities on exchanges, the Maloney Act-while not focusing in detail
on potential jurisdictional conflicts-presumably did not intend to
duplicate the exchange's function in this regard.
Without exploring in detail the areas in which the jurisdictions
of the exchanges and the NASD overlapped prior to the 1975
Amendments and the addition of section 17(d) (1)(B), which authorizes the Commission to allocate rulemaking authority among selfregulatory organizations that share jurisdiction under the 1934
Act,' each type of organization was authorized generally to adopt
standards of conduct and qualifications for its members, based upon
their participation in a particular market, as well as transactions
effected by their members in these markets and with customers.
Neither of these two classes of self-regulatory organizations, however, regulated transactions in the separate municipal securities
markets or the professional qualifications and business standards of
securities firms participating in these markets as such. Bank dealers
were not subject to any self-regulatory organization with respect to
their transactions in municipal securities.
Congress in enacting the 1975 Amendments revised certain aspects of the system of self-regulation maintained by the exchanges
and the NASD. Although most of these changes are not significant
for purposes of this discussion, the manner in which the rulemaking
jurisdiction of the exchanges and the NASD was restated is pertinent to understanding section 15B(b)(2) of the 1934 Act. Although
the Board is not a membership organization and need not qualify
for registration with the Commission to receive its delegated governmental powers, it is under an affirmative obligation to adopt certain
types of rules, which substantially parallel the revised minimum
59. The Commission has adopted Rule 17d-1, which relates to examination duties of
self-regulatory organizations with respect to their members' compliance with applicable financial responsibility rules, and proposed Rule 17d-2, which would permit self-regulatory
organizations to submit allocation plans covering other regulatory functions to the Commission for approval. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 12352 (April 20, 1976).
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rule requirements for registration under sections 6 and 15A of the
1934 Act.
Addressing the substantial changes effected by the 1975
Amendments in former sections 6 and 19(b) of the 1934 Act, which
are not indicated in the legislative history as reflecting a change in
the substantive content of the exchanges' and the NASD's rulemaking jurisdiction, the Senate Committee expressed its belief "that the
statutory pattern governing the scope of the NASD's authority is
sound."6 In addition, the Senate Committee noted that:
Under the [1975 Amendments] the scope of the rule-making authority and
responsibility of all self-regulatory organizations would be defined in terms of
purposes and standards rather than subject matters. The purposes to be served
by self-regulatory rules would be expressed affirmatively and negatively (what
the rules must be, and what they may not be, designed to accomplish) . . . .,

Apart from separate provisions relating directly to the membership
form of organization, and, in the case of the NASD, form and content of quotations, the statutory bases for the exchanges' and the
NASD's rulemaking jurisdiction over the standards afid conduct of
their members, as well as market regulation of the substance and
form of transactions effected by their members, are set forth in the
new and almost identical sections 6(b)(5) and 15A(b) (6) of the 1934
Act in terms of purposes and standards. The only explicit limitation
upon these grants of authority also is set forth in these two sections:
that the rules adopted "not [be] designed.

. .

to regulate by virtue

of any authority conferred by [the 1934 Act] matters not related
to the purposes of [the 1934 Act] or the administration of the [selfregulatory organization]." 2 This limitation was added, according
to the Senate Committee, to assure that "the diversification of securities firms [would] not automatically extend the jurisdiction of
the self-regulatory agencies." 3
Comparing the provisions of section 15B(b)(2) of the 1934 Act
with the new sections 6(b) and 15A(b), it is clear that section
15B(b)(2)(C) parallels and is based upon the "purposes and standards" grants of rulemaking jurisdiction to the exchanges and the
NASD under the 1934 Act. The other paragraphs of section
15B(b)(2), which set forth minimum subject matter areas for the
Board to consider, have counterparts in the separate minimum rule
conditions set forth in sections 6 and 15A of the 1934 Act, accommo60.
61.
62.
63.

S. REP., supra note 6, at 27.
Id.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 47.
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date the nonmembership form of the Board, or address specific
questions in the municipal securities markets, such as purchases of
new issues by municipal securities investment portfolios. Section
15B(b)(2)(C) contains the operative language that authorizes the
Board to adopt the bulk of its regulations concerning the municipal
securities markets and participants. It would appear from the similarity of section 15B(b) (2) (C) to sections 6(b) (5) and 15A(b) (6) that
the type, nature, and scope of the Board's rulemaking jurisdiction
are to be comparable to the jurisdiction of the exchanges and the
NASD.
What, then, is the function of the statement in section
15B(b)(2) that "[t]he Board shall . . . adopt rules to effect the
purposes of [the 1934 Act] with respect to transactionsin municipal securities effected by brokers, dealers, and municipal securities
dealers"? It should be noted that this language does not read "adopt
rules with respect to transactions." This interpretation would be
inconsistent with the understanding developed concerning the
meaning of the "purposes and standards" set forth in section
15B(b) (2)(C), as well as other paragraphs of section 15B(b)(2), such
as paragraph (A) concerning professional qualifications, that clearly
are not transactional in nature. Also, this interpretation effectively
would preclude the Board from regulating municipal securities professionals as such except to the extent specifically authorized in
other paragraphs of section 15B(b)(2) and contradict the Senate
Committee's stated intent that the Board "have primary rulemaking authority with respect to the activities of municipal securities
8' 2
dealers and transactions in municipal securities.
Read properly, it would appear that the quoted language from
section 15B(b)(2) does not restrict the Board's jurisdiction to transactions themselves, but indicates the markets in which the Board
is intended to develop a system of regulation, as well as the capacities in which the Board is to regulate market participants. Like
sections 6(b)(5) and 15A(b)(6), section 15B(b)(2)(C) also provides
that the Board's rules not be designed "to regulate . . . matters not
related to the purposes of [the 1934 Act]," which apparently was
intended to preclude regulation of non-securities activities of regulated persons." As this limitation alone would have duplicated the
existing market jurisdiction of the exchanges and the NASD over
listed and over-the-counter nonexempted securities with respect to
their members that also are municipal securities professionals, a
64.

See text accompanying notes 62 & 63 supra.
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further definition of the purposes of the 1934 Act the Board was
intended to promote-"with respect to transactions in municipal
securities"-was needed. In addition, the references to municipal
securities brokers and municipal securities dealers in the minimum
subject matter areas of sections 15B(b) (2) (A) through (K) must be
read in light of the broader reference to "brokers, dealers, and
municipal securities dealers" in the general statement of section
15B(b)(2). Section 15B(c)(1), for example, prohibits the use of any
facilities of interstate commerce by brokers, dealers, or municipal
securities dealers "to effect any transaction in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any municipal security in
contravention of any rule of the-Board." This underscores the
Board's authority to address rules not only to sole municipal securities brokers and municipal securities dealers, but also to brokers
and dealers whose level of activity in municipal securities would
appear insufficient to make them municipal securities brokers or
municipal securities dealers.
Clearly, the applicability of a Board rule to a broker, dealer, or
municipal securities dealer depends upon the existence of a nexus
between the rule and a transaction in municipal securities, the
terms of the rule, and the capacity in which the person or firm to
which the rule is sought to be applied is acting. Because of the broad
rulemaking jurisdiction of the Board, it has attempted to exercise
circumspection in delimiting the intended scope of application of its
rules by referring only to municipal securities brokers and municipal securities dealers when appropriate in view of the Board's statutory purposes and imposing substantive and procedural requirements that are compatible with existing regulations of other selfregulatory organizations to which some municipal securities professionals are subject.
(3)

Enforcement of Board Rules

Unlike the national securities exchanges and the NASD, the
Board has neither inspection nor enforcement powers with respect
to its rules. The NASD is directed by section 19(g) (1) (B) of the 1934
Act, "absent reasonable justification or excuse," to enforce compliance with Board rules by its members and their associated persons.65
In addition, the Commission's power to impose disciplinary sanctions on and revoke the registration of brokers, dealers, municipal
65. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78f(g)(1)(B) (Supp. 1976). National securities exchanges, unlike
the NASD, are not under a specific duty to enforce compliance with Board rules by their
members. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78f(g)(1)(A) (Supp. 1976).
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securities dealers, and their associated persons has been strengthened generally and now includes violation of Board rules as a basis
for revocation under sections 15(b)(4) and 15B(c)(2) of the 1934 Act.
Compliance with Board rules by bank dealers and their associated persons is enforceable by both the Commission and the appropriate bank regulatory agency."6 Rules of the Commission applicable to municipal securities dealers and transactions in municipal
securities, like comparable rules of the Board, are also enforceable
by the three federal bank regulatory agencies."7 Whether the ultimate sanction is revocation of registration as a municipal securities
dealer under section 15B of the 1934 Act or termination of insured
status under section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 8 the
appropriate bank regulatory agency or the Commission, whichever
is initiating investigative or enforcement activities, is obligated to
notify the other and to consult with it concerning not only the feasibility and desirability of coordination with the other agency, but
also the effect of its proposed activities on sound banking practices
(if the Commission is the initiating body)69 and investor protection
(if a bank regulatory agency is the initiating body)7
To aid municipal securities professionals in complying with the
Board's rules and to assist the Commission, the three federal bank
regulatory agencies, and the NASD in applying uniform inspection
and enforcement criteria, the Board by rule has provided for advisory opinions and interpretations of its rules.71 These opinions and
interpretations, which are rendered at the request of any interested
person, represent the Board's intent in adopting the rules discussed
and do not address the meaning of statutory definitions or the applicability of substantive or procedural requirements of the 1934 Act
7
to individuals or firms. 1
66. Section 3(a)(34)(A) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(34)(A) (Supp. 1976),
defines the "appropriate regulatory agency" with respect to municipal securities dealers. All
municipal securities dealers other than bank dealers are subject to oversight or direct regulation by the Commission. The appropriate regulatory agency for each type of banking institution is the federal bank regulatory agency responsible for regulating its ordinary banking
activities. See text following note 16 supra.
67. 1934 Act § 15B(c)(5), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(c)(5) (Supp. 1976).
68. 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
69. 1934 Act § 15B(c)(6)(A)(ii), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(c)(6)(A)(ii) (Supp. 1976).
70. 1934 Act § 15B(c)(6)(B)(ii), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(c)(6)(B) (ii) (Supp. 1976).
71. MSRB Rule A-8(b) (1975).
72. See, e.g., MSRB Interpretation G-1:75:1 (Nov. 17, 1975).
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III. RULEMAKING RELATIONSHIPS
A. Adoption and Effectiveness of Board Rules
Section 15B(b)(2) of the 1934 Act authorizes the Board to propose and adopt rules within its rulemaking jurisdiction. Moreover,
the Board is directed to adopt rules concerning the specified subject
matter areas set forth in paragraphs (A) through (K) of section
15B(b)(2). This, however, is but the beginning of the rulemaking
process. Any change, addition, or deletion adopted by the Board
relating to its rules is a "proposed rule change," as defined by section 19(b)(1) of the 1934 Act, and like proposed rule changes
adopted by national securities exchanges and the NASD, is subject
to approval by the Commission under section 19(b). In addition, the
Board is required to file a copy of each of its proposed rule changes
with the three federal bank regulatory agencies. 3
Approval by the Commission, which generally is required prior
to effectiveness, 74 requires a finding by the Commission that the
proposed rule change "is consistent with the requirements of [the
1934 Act] and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to"
the Board. 75 If the Commission contemplates disapproving the proposed rule change, it must commence proceedings giving notice of
the contemplated grounds for disapproval and affording an opportunity for hearing. 7 At the conclusion of the proceedings, the Commission by order must approve or disapprove the entire proposed
rule change; it is not authorized to revise or rework the Board's
proposed rule changes under section 19(b).
The Commission also is afforded the opportunity by section
19(c) of the 1934 Act to initiate rulemaking by abrogating, adding
to, or deleting from the Board's rules. In contrast to the summary
abrogation provisions of section 19(b)(3)(C), the Commission may
act under section 19(c) only by giving notice to the Board, publish73. 1934 Act § 17(c)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78q(c)(1) (Supp. 1976).
74. Under § 19(b)(3)(A) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(b)(3)(A) (Supp. 1976), rules
relating to the Board's internal administration and its fees and assessments become effective
on filing with the Commission. The Commission, however, may abrogate these automatically
effective rules summarily within 60 days of their filing and require the Board to resubmit
them in accordance with prior approval procedures. Id. § 19(b)(3)(C), 15 U.S.C.A. §
78s(b)(3)(C) (Supp. 1976). Rules not falling within the provisions of § 19(b)(3)(A) may be
made effective summarily by the Commission "if it appears. . . that such action is necessary
for the protection of investors, the maintenance of fair and orderly markets, or the safeguarding of securities or funds," but also are subject to summary abrogation by the Commission.
Id. §§ 19(b)(3)(B), (C), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78s(b)(3)(B), (C) (Supp. 1976).
75. Id. § 19(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(b)(2) (Supp. 1976).
76. Id. § 19(b)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 1976).
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ing notice of its proposed action in the FederalRegister (including
the text of the proposed rule to be amended, adopted, or abrogated
and a statement of the Commission's reasons therefor), and giving
interested persons an opportunity to make oral presentations on the
record and present written submissions. The standard against
which the Commission's rulemaking activities under section 19(c)
are measured is whether the action is necessary or appropriate to the
fair administration of the Board, the conformity of the Board's rules
with the requirements of the 1934 Act and applicable rules and
regulations, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the 1934
Act with respect to transactions in municipal securities." In areas
of substantive rulemaking, this standard for Commission initiative
-necessary or appropriate to conform the Board's rules to applicable requirements-is similar to the criteria for Commission approval of the Board's proposed rule changes.
The difference arises by implication in the contemplated timing of the Commission's exercise of its powers under section 19(c).
The legislative history of the 1975 Amendments demonstrates a
clear reaffirmation of Congress' intent to utilize the self-regulatory
mechanism with respect to the municipal securities industry. 8 Indeed, the following statement made by the Senate Committee emphasizes this point:
The Committee believes that the Board has ample authority to deal with the
problems of the municipal securities industry. The Board is intended to be the
primary medium for regulation of the municipal securities industry and should
be afforded ample opportunity to develop responsible rules for the industry."

Turning to a comparison of the two standards, the Commission
is directed to approve proposed rule changes of the Board if "consistent" with applicable statutory and regulatory requirements," but
merely is authorizedto initiate substantive rulemaking activities for
the regulation of the municipal securitios industry if "necessary or
appropriate" to conform the Board's rules to applicable statutory
and regulatory requirements.' It would appear that this latter authority principally addresses two situations: inaction by the Board
in regulating a particular aspect of the municipal securities industry, i.e. failure to adopt rules relating to identified subject matter
areas under sections 15B(b)(2)(A) through (K), or a substantial
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. § 19(c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(c) (Supp. 1976).
See text accompanying note 24 supra.
S. REP., supra note 6, at 48.
1934 Act § 19(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(b)(2) (Supp. 1976).
Id. § 19(c) at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(c) (Supp. 1976).
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change in knowledge, or market circumstances rendering a Board
rule previously approved by the Commission no longer "consistent"
with applicable requirements under the 1934 Act.82 Although section
19(c) does not by its terms impose a time limitation or deference
provision, preemptive exercise of this rulemaking authority by the
Commission in either case would be inconsistent with the application of the principle of self-regulation envisioned by the 1975
Amendments and the express language of the Senate Committee.
Thus, while the Commission clearly is afforded the ultimate say
concerning rules of the Board, the 1975 Amendments assume a substantial measure of discretion in the Commission's exercise of these
powers.
B.

ConcurrentJurisdictionwith Other Rulemaking Bodies

The unique rulemaking jurisdiction of the Board-extending
beyond a membership base to any broker or dealer effecting transactions in municipal securities, regardless of the firm's membership
in the NASD or one or more national securities exchanges-raises
interesting concerns for the indirect effects of the exercise of the
Board's rulemaking powers in areas of legitimate concern to other
self-regulatory organizations. Similarly, as noted below,83 the Commission has direct rulemaking authority over specified types of general securities transactions and professionals that overlaps certain
portions of the Board's rulemaking authority.
In light of the allocation of self-regulatory obligations to the
Board under the 1975 Amendments, failure of the other self82. S. REP., supra note 6, at 50. It is noteworthy that approval of a Board rule under §
19(b)(2) necessarily entails an affirmative finding by the Commission that the proposed rule
change is within the powers of the Board and is consistent with any other applicable requirements under the 1934 Act. See id. at 28. Amendment by the Commission of previously
approved Board rules should be distinguished from amendment of other rules of the Board
in effect. Thus, rules effective on filing under § 19(b)(3)(A) do not relate to new, substantive
regulation of the industry and are subject to summary abrogation by the Commission under
§ 19(b)(3)(C) and resubmission by the Board under the prior approval procedure of §
19(b)(2). Rules summarily made effective by the Commission under § 19(b)(2)(B) entail at
least an informal determination by the Commission that they are "necessary" for one of the
three stated reasons-i.e. purposes of the 1934 Act-and are subject to summary abrogation
by the Commission under § 19(b)(3)(C) and resubmission for approval under § 19(b)(2). As
it would appear that recourse to the Commission's powers under § 19(c) would be inappropriate at a time when summary abrogation under § 19(b)(3)(C) is available to invoke the prior
approval procedure of § 19(b)(2), rules effective under § 19(b)(3) and no longer subject to
summary abrogation thereunder should be viewed as standing on the same basis as rules
approved under § 19(b)(2) for purposes of the Commission's exercise of its § 19(c) powers.
83. See part re.B(2), infra.
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regulatory organizations and the Commission to acknowledge and
accommodate the rulemaking jurisdiction of the Board might tend
to undermine the Board's ability to function as the primary rulemaker for the municipal securities industry, a result conflicting with
Congress' apparent intent. The Board, on the other hand, also needs
to be attuned to the effect of its rules upon persons regulated by
other bodies-the exchanges, the NASD, and the bank regulatory
organizations.
(1)

Other Self-Regulatory Organizations

Under section 15B(b)(2) of the 1934 Act, the Board is directed
to adopt rules relating to just and equitable principles of trade,
standards of professional qualification and operational capability,
and form and content of quotations. Under section 15A of the 1934
Act, the NASD is accorded rulemaking authority over its members
for similar matters, 4 but not with respect to municipal securities.8 5
Although the possibility of a direct conflict between NASD rules
and rules of the Board seems extremely remote, indirect effects
upon NASD members may occur merely by reason of the Board's
establishing additional rules relating to municipal securities. Thus,
an NASD member firm that is a municipal securities broker or
municipal securities dealer may be required to meet two sets of
standards of operational capability. The Board is aware that its
rules in this area may have an impact on the internal structure and
organization of the member firm and has attempted to devise its
rules on professional qualifications and operational capability to
avoid this result. Nevertheless, the Board is under a duty to use its
collective expertise in proposing and adopting rules that in its judgment serve the purposes of the 1934 Act with respect to municipal
securities. This requires a balancing of the Board's statutory purposes and standards, which do not address specifically the maintenance of the existing structure of integrated firms that participate
84.

See 1934 Act §§ 15A(b)(6), (11), (g)(3), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78o-3(b)(6), (11), (g)(3)

(Supp. 1976).
85. Although § 3(a)(12) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1970), provides that
municipal securities are not deemed to be exempted securities for purposes of § 15A generally,
§§ 15A(b)(6), (11), (g)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(b)(6), (11), (g)(2) (Supp. 1976), are expressly
excluded. The reference to § 15A(g)(2) apparently is a printer's error and § 15A(g)(3) was
intended. Section 15A(f), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(f) (Supp. 1976), provides that § 15A shall not
"be construed to apply with respect to any transaction by a broker or dealer in any exempted
security." Accordingly, the NASD's rulemaking powers under §§ 15A(b)(6), (11) & (g)(3) are

viewed as being inapplicable to transactions in municipal securities.
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in the municipal securities markets, and an evaluation of the feasibility of alternative methods of furthering these purposes.
(2)

The Commission

The persons and firms to which the Board's rules may be made
applicable are (with the minor exception of intrastate municipal
securities brokers) subject to registration with the Commission as
brokers or dealers under section 15 or as municipal securities dealers
under section 15B of the 1934 Act. Under sections 10(b), 15(b)(7),
15(c)(1), 15(c)(2), and 17(a) of the 1934 Act, the Commission has
rulemaking jurisdiction over matters that are also covered by the
Board's rulemaking jurisdiction under section 15B(b) (2) of the 1934
Act. Under section 15(b)(7), for example, the Commission is authorized to adopt standards of professional qualification and operational
capability for registered brokers and dealers, which would not include bank dealers. The Board, on the other hand, is directed by
section 15B(b)(2)(A) to adopt standards of professional qualification and operational capability for municipal securities brokers and
municipal securities dealers, many of which are registered as brokers or dealers with the Commission.
The Board's rules in this area-unlike the Commission's under
section 15(b)(7), which relates to brokers and dealers generally-must take into consideration not only unique elements of
transactions in municipal securities, but also the status of bank
dealers. In addition, the import of the principle of equal regulation,
which played a substantial role in the creation of the Board and the
definition of its rulemaking authority, under the 1975 Amendments, is competitive equality between securities firms and banks
as participants in the municipal securities industry." It would appear appropriate, therefore, for the Commission to exercise judicious discretion in initiating rulemaking activities under its separate authority in areas that might tend to derogate from the Board's
ability to assure uniform regulation of the municipal securities industry under section 15B of the 1934 Act.
IV.

ACTIVITIES OF THE BOARD

Effective self-regulation of the municipal securities industry,
like any other industry, requires that industry expertise be incorpo86. As noted by Commissioner John R. Evans in his testimony before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee, "[i]f the advantage of unequal regulation were
added to the existing economic advantages of banks in the municipal field, nonbank dealers
might well find it even more difficult to survive." 1974 Hearings,supra note 18, at 51.
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rated into the rulemaking process. Because the Board lacks the
membership base of the other self-regulatory organizations from
which to elect its rulemakers,87 the statutory qualifications of Board
members, by requiring that members be "associated with" their
constituencies, assure this active, constituent participation. In this
way the Board is able to take continuous stock of industry conditions and needs by the direct involvement of its industry members.
Public representatives similarly bring a fresh awareness of issuer,
investor, and public concerns to the Board. In addition, the Board
has obtained direct industry involvement by publishing proposed
rules in exposure draft form for comment prior to adoption by the
Board and filing with the Commission.
Since its first meeting on September 16, 1975, the Board has
been actively engaged in two principal endeavors: proposing and
adopting rules under section 15B(b)(2) and performing a consultative and analytical function with respect to issues affecting the
municipal securities industry. These include various Commission
proposals with respect to its regulatory activities and the issues of
disclosure and issuer and underwriter liability that have arisen since
enactment of the 1975 Amendments.
A.

Rulemaking-Presentand Future

Due to the time interval between the writing of this Article and
its publication, a detailed review of the status of the Board's rulemaking activities almost necessarily would be outdated. Accordingly, the following listing is provided to show the areas in which
the Board has adopted rules or anticipates making rule proposals in
the near future and the approximate order of priority in which the
Board will address these areas. Subjects marked with one asterisk
are covered by rules in effect, published for comment, or presently
filed with the Commission; subjects marked with two asterisks were
under consideration and active discussion by the Board as of the end
of May 1976.
* Administrative rules, including fees and assessments
* Definitional rules
* Definition of separately identifiable department or division of a
bank
* Standards of professional qualification
* Recordkeeping requirements
* Information concerning associated persons
0.087
* Sales during the underwriting period
87. See part ll.B.(1) supra.
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" Interdealer transactions, including:
Settlement dates
Confirmations
Delivery of securities
Payment
Reclamations and rejections
Close-out procedures
* Quotations relating to municipal securities
* Reports of sales or purchases
* Form and content of customer confirmations
**
**
**
**
**
**

Discretionary accounts
Fair prices and commissions
Charges for services performed
Recommendations to customers
Concessions
Periodic compliance examinations

Use of information obtained in a fiduciary capacity
Payments designed to influence market prices
Advertising
Disclosure of participation or interest in distributions
Supervision of activities and personnel
Customers' securities and funds
Disclosure of financial condition
Transactions for personnel of another dealer
Gifts and gratuities
Short sales of municipal securities
Stabilizing
Prevention of manipulative acts and practices
Credit transactions and terms
Financial reporting forms
Arbitration
Procedures for nomination and election of Board members
The Board may direct its attention to other matters not comprehended within the foregoing list.
The Board's rule adopting a definition of "separately identifiable department or division of a bank" for purposes of section
3(a)(30) of the 1934 Act underscores the types of industry practices
best brought out through the self-regulatory process. The function
of the term is to permit the registration of the municipal securities
dealer function of a bank dealer rather than requiring the registration of the entire legal entity of which the dealer function is a part."
88. A comparable provision in § 15(b)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 1976),
permits the registration of a separately identifiable department or division of broker or dealer
in certain circumstances.
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This is accomplished by defining the term "municipal securities
dealer" to include only the dealer function of a bank dealer if this
function can be isolated and properly described in accordance with
the Board's definition of "separately identifiable department or division."" Structuring a rule to define this term obviously requires a
particularized knowledge of the internal organization of bank dealers and an awareness of the various types of activities conducted by
banks incident to their dealer activities in municipal securities.
The rule commences by assuming a hypothetical business unit,
one that "conducts all of the activities of the -bank relating to the
conduct of business as a municipal securities dealer."9 This language ordinarily would be sufficient to permit the exclusion of investment activities of the bank, if truly independent of the dealer
function, but it would not identify the other activities that must be
within the registered unit. In other words, it is insufficient as a
definition of the activities conducted as a municipal securities
dealer. Accordingly, the rule lists municipal securities dealer activities, all of which must be within the registered unit if engaged in
by the bank dealer. These activities include: the underwriting, trading, and selling of municipal securities; processing and clearance
functions; research, analysis, and preparation of literature; and
maintenance of records. Since adoption of this rule, the Board has
proposed adding financial advisory and consultant services to the
list of dealer activities to recognize the integral role many bank
dealers perform in advising issuers of municipal securities concerning proposed new issues and communicating with prospective investors.
The definition also needs to acknowledge variations in the organizational structures of bank dealers and their dealer activities.
It is not uncommon, for example, for a bank to separate its clearing
activities from its trading and underwriting activities, either geographically or organizationally. Similarly, research is often conducted by a separate unit, even though it is integral to the bank's
ability to underwrite general obligations securities.
Accordingly, the Board's rule is designed to permit organizational and even geographical separation of the subgroups performing dealer activities. This, however, raises additional considerations
that are addressed in the rule. Because registration is but one element of the regulation of bank dealers, the definition also must
be designed to facilitate inspection and enforcement functions with
89.
90.

1934 Act § 3(a)(30), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(30) (Supp. 1976).
MSRB Rule G-1 (1975).
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respect to the registered unit. This is accomplished by imposing two
conditions: first, the registered unit and its employees must be supervised with respect to the day-to-day conduct of its municipal
securities dealer activities by one or more officers designated by the
board of directors of the bank for this purpose. Secondly, the records
of all the subgroups comprising the registered bank unit must be
maintained separately from the unregistered portion of the bank or
be separately extractable from general bank records, and all such
dealer records must be maintained in a manner designed or otherwise sufficiently accessible to permit independent examination of
the registered bank unit. These two conditions have the effect,
among others, of defining lines of responsibility within the bank's
general organizational structure that relate directly to the registered
unit.
Without examining in detail the substance of the Board's other
rulemaking activities, it should be noted that active industry participation in the Board's development of rules concerning inter-dealer
transactions and professional qualifications, combined with the
knowledge and background of the members of the Board, have enabled the Board to adopt rules in these areas with greater speed and
certainty than likely would have been possible outside the selfregulatory framework. Direct industry involvement has been assured by the Board's procedure of publishing its proposed rules in
exposure draft form for comment prior to adoption by the Board and
filing with the Commission.
B.

Disclosure and Liability

At hearings held in February of this year by the Subcommittee
on Securities of the Senate Committee, testimony was presented by
government officials, industry participants, and investors concerning the need for federal legislation in the area of municipal securities
disclosure and liability in connection with underwritings. Congressional interest in these areas led to the introduction of two bills: S.
2574, introduced by Senator Thomas Eagleton, and S. 2969, cosponsored by Senators Harrison Williams and John Tower. S. 2574
would subject municipal securities to the registration requirements
of the 1933 Act and their issuers to the reporting requirements of the
1934 Act. S. 2969 would require issuers, based upon minimum dollar requirements of issue size and amount of securities outstanding,
to prepare disclosure documents (called distribution statements in
the bill) and annual reports containing statutorily prescribed information. Preparation of the required disclosure documents would be
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a condition to the issuer's sale of its securities to underwriters.
The Board presented a detailed, written statement of comments and recommendations on the two bills to the Subcommittee.
Noting that the Board is precluded by the terms of the Tower
Amendment" from requiring issuers, directly or indirectly, to make
disclosures with respect to the issuance of their securities, the Board
proposed that Congress provide for an independent committee representative of issuers, underwriters, and investors to develop voluntary disclosure guidelines for all new issues of municipal securities.
These guidelines would be effective unless disapproved by the Commission as being inconsistent with the public interest. The voluntary approach recommended by the Board would be consonant, in
the Board's view, with the powers and prerogatives accorded states
under the Constitution and would be enforced by demands of the
marketplace.
In addition, the Board recommended the enactment of a statutory clarification of the respective duties and responsibilities of all
participants engaged in the process of distributing new issues of
municipal securities. Under existing law, only implied causes of
action arising under the antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934
Acts are available to investors in municipal securities. Recognizing
constitutional questions concerning the applicability of implied
causes of action to issuers of municipal securities that are states"
and the undesirability of relegating the participants' duties and
liabilities to subsequent definition by the courts, the Board suggested the creation of two express civil liability provisions.
Modeled on section 11 of the 1933 Act, the first provision would
subject issuers of municipal securities and, within prescribed limits,
underwriters and accountants and other experts to suit for damages
in connection with material misstatements in or omissions from
disclosure documents produced by the issuer in connection with its
distribution. Defenses would be established to reflect the practical
ability of each category of distribution participant, including the
91. 1934 Act § 15B(d), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(d) (Supp. 1976). This provision also precludes the Commission and the Board from requiring, directly or indirectly, an issuer of
municipal securities to file information with the Commission or the Board "in connection
with the issuance, sale, or distribution of [municipal] securities" prior to the sale of the
securities by the issuer. Id. § 15B(d)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(d)(1) (Supp. 1976).
92. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); cf. National League of Cities v. Usery,
44 U.S.L.W., 4974 (U.S. June 24, 1976), rev'g National League of Cities v. Brennan, Civ.
No. 74-1812 (D.D.C. 1974); Nowak, The Scope of CongressionalPower To Create Causes of
Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth
Amendments, 75 CoLUm. L. REv. 1413 (1975).
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issuer, to ascertain the completeness and accuracy of the information in question. The defense afforded underwriters of municipal
securities would reflect their inability in a competitive bid situation
to perform a due diligence function comparable to that performed
by corporate underwriters, which participate in far fewer distributions in the course of a year and receive substantially higher underwriting profits for these services.9 3 The second provision contemplated by the Board would subject all participants in the distribution process to civil damages for active fraud or gross negligence in
connection with a material misstatement or omission.
Finally, the Board suggested that it would be consistent with
federal legislation establishing a mechanism for the development of
disclosure guidelines to authorize the Board to adopt rules relating
to the distribution of municipal securities disclosure documents by
brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers.
Since the date of the Board's statement on disclosure, the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder94 has clarified
the scope of liability under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule
10b-5. In Hochfelder, a private damages suit against an accounting
firm, the Court interpreted section 10(b) of the 1934 Act to authorize
the Commission to adopt rules prohibiting intentionally, but not
merely negligently, fraudulent conduct. The Court reserved for future consideration the questions whether civil liability for damages
may be premised upon reckless behavior and whether scienter is a
necessary element of an injunctive proceeding based on section
10(b).95
V.

CONCLUSIONS

The year 1975 brought great changes to the municipal securities
industry: municipal securities professionals became subject as such
for the first time to registration with the Commission, and the industry saw the Board established as its self-regulator. The Board,
with its unique mandate and relationship to other regulatory bodies,
was created to systematize and facilitate transactions in municipal
securities and to regulate the business standards of municipal securities professionals for the benefit of the industry, issuers, and the
public.
93. This defense would relate to information an issuer might be required to disclose that
originates with another governmental organization not within the control of the issuer, e.g.,
demographic information published by the Bureau of the Census.
94. BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 346, I-1 (March 31, 1976).
95. Id. at 1-3 n.12.
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Consistent with congressional recognition of the importance of
the municipal securities markets, the Board has endeavored to
fulfill its obligations as a self-regulatory organization as effectively
as possible. With the adoption of rules and rule proposals as well as
other Board activities affecting the industry, the Board has made a
start in developing an appropriate legal and ethical framework in
which the municipal securities industry can continue to grow and
to meet the needs and expectations of both issuers and investors.

